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Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-A Substantive Constitutional
Right to Minority Representation in the Legislature?
One of the most significant new developments in constitutional law
during the past decade was the application of the fourteenth amendment

to legislative apportionment. In a series of landmark decisions, of which
the most basic were Baker v. Carr' and Reynolds v. Sims,2 the United
States Supreme Court held that apportionment plans which are not
based on population violate the equal protection clause.3 Left unanswered by these cases, however, was another important reapportionment
issue: the constitutionality of multi-member districting. This was the
issue before the Supreme Court in two recent cases, Whitcomb v.
Chavis4 and Connor v. Johnson.5
Three arguments have been advanced against the constitutionality

of multi-member districts. Two of these arguments were developed by
Professor John F. Banzhaf. Banzhaf contended that all multi-member
districts are unconstitutional. First, he suggested that multi-member
'369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3
Confusion has developed over one aspect of this equal-population requirement. Contrary to
widespread press reports, the Supreme Court has never laid down a rule that whenever a state
legislature considers reapportionment, it is required to adopt the one plan of all those proposed
which comes closest to absolute population equality. In other words, the introduction of one
reapportionment plan does not automatically render unconstitutional all other plans with larger
deviations. Such a rule has, however, been adopted by a few lower federal courts. Preisler v.
Secretary of State, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo. 1966), affd mem. sub nom. Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967); League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Neb. 1965), appeal dismissed sub nom. Marsh v. Dworak, 382 U.S. 1021 (1966); and especially
Preisler v. Secretary of State, 279 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affd sub nom. Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). The lower court in the latter Preislercase was particularly explicit
in its statement and application of the rule. Significantly, however, the Supreme Court, in affirming,
did not adopt the lower court's rationale, but only mentioned the existence of a better plan as one
of several factors indicating the unconstitionality of the plan at issue.
The rule is law in New Jersey, having been adopted in Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 222 A.2d
101 (1966). In fact, the New Jersey court has carried it to its logical extreme, in Koziol v. Burkhardt, 51 N.J. 412, 241 A.2d 451 (1968), declaring unconstitutional a plan with a difference in
population of only 851 between two Congressional districts, because a proposed alternative reduced
the disparity to 13 persons.
None of the courts adopting the rule have held that it takes precedence over the preservation
of county lines-that a "better" plan which divides counties invalidates a "worse" plan which does
not. The New Jersey court rejected this suggestion in Jackman v. Bodine, 55 N.J. 371, 378-83, 262
A.2d 389, 393-95 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1971).
4403 U.S. 124 (1971).
5402 U.S. 690 (1971) (per curiam).
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districts give excessive power to their inhabitants and discriminate
against voters in smaller districts. Defining a citizen's "voting power"
as his chance of casting the tie-breaking vote in an election, Banzhaf
"demonstrate[d] mathematically that . . voting power does not vary
inversely with the size of the district and that to increase legislative seats
in proportion to increased population gives undue voting power to the
voter in the multi-member district since he has more chances to determine election outcomes than does the voter in [either] single-member" '
or smaller multi-member districts. Second, Banzhaf suggested that
large-district representatives are more effective in the legislature than are
other representatives, because they can and often do vote together as a
bloc. By voting en bloc, they can cast the deciding votes on bills more
7
often than they could if they voted independently.
The third argument against multi-member districting was perhaps
even stronger than the other two, even though it was less sweeping in its
scope. This contention was that multi-member districting denied representation to minorities within large districts. For instance, ghetto Negroes could elect legislators of their own if there were single-member
districts, but under a multi-member system they are outnumbered by
white people and denied representation. The Supreme Court first considered this argument in Fortson v. Dorsey8 and Burns v. Richardson.9 In
those cases it refused to hold multi-member districts unconstitutional
per se, but it indicated that if some future plaintiff could present factual
evidence that multi-member districts do discriminate against minorities,
it might rule in his favor. 0
The plaintiffs in Whitcomb challenged the Indiana legislative apportionment plan adopted in 1965. According to this plan, Marion
403 U.S. at 144-45. See Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the
"One Man, One Vote" Principle,75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
'Cf Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L.
REv. 317 (1965). As the Court pointed out, having the legislators from a multi-member district

vote en bloc "is tantamount to the district having one representative with several votes." 403 U.S.
at 146.
8379 U.S. 433 (1965).
9384 U.S. 73 (1966).
1379 U.S. at 439; 384 U.S. at 88.
In support of this minority-representation argument, see Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade
for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote," 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 219, 258-61, 264-68; Jewell,
Minority Representation:A Politicalor Judicial Question, 53 KY. L.J. 267, 276-88 (1965); Note,
Reapportionment,79 HARV. L. REV. 1224, 1258-61 (1966).
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County elected fifteen representatives and eight senators. The plaintiffs
presented detailed evidence showing that Marion County contained a
Negro ghetto; that ghetto residents were rarely elected to the legislature;
and that if Marion County were broken down into single-member district, three House of Representatives districts and one senatorial district
would fall to the ghetto.
The lower court accepted the plaintiffs' minority-representation
argument and held that the Marion County multi-member district discriminated against ghetto Negroes." In addition, it found that the Indiana legislature did not meet the constitutional standards of population
equality among districts because the deviations from equality ranged up
to 14.521 percent, 2 a figure almost as high as those condemned by the
Supreme Court in Swann v. Adams" and Kilgarlin v. Hill. 4 Therefore,
instead of merely ordering the abolition of the Marion County multimember district, the court required the legislature to reapportion the
whole state. Though the lower court did not explicitly accept the arguments of Professor Banzhaf, it did instruct the legislature not to create
multi-member districts anywhere in the state in its new apportionment."1
When the legislature failed to reapportion, the court issued its own
plan." From the order issuing this plan, the state appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed. Dealing with each of plaintiffs' contentions, it rejected Banzhaf's first argument;' 7 it held that plaintiffs had
not presented sufficient evidence in support of Banzhaf's second arguments;' 8 and it similarly held that plaintiffs had not proved their case
with respect to minority non-representation."
"Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1385-87 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
12d. at 1387-88.
13385 U.S. 440 (1967).
14386 U.S. 120 (1967).
15305 F. Supp. at 1391-92. Actually the lower court permitted Indiana to use small multimember districts if all the districts in the state were multi~member districts and all elected the same
number of legislators. This theoretical possibility was politically impractical; in effect, singlemember districts were required.
"Chavis v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
1403 U.S. at 144-46.
"Isd.at 146-48.
"Id. at 148-55. The Supreme Court did approve the lower court's finding that the deviations
from equality in Indiana's apportionment plan were unconstitutionally large, id. at 16 1-63, but this
was of little practical importance, since the Indiana legislature had adopted a new plan based on
the 1970 census figures while the appeal was pendifig. Id. at 140.
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The Court did not entirely foreclose the possibility that the plaintiffs might ultimately prevail if they could prove that the establishment
of single-member districts would significantly affect particular legislative decisions in a manner favorable to them. However, the decision
clearly shows that the plaintiffs will be required to produce a much
greater quantity of evidence to obtain a favorable decision than did the
plaintiffs in cases such as Reynolds v. Sims. There, the plaintiffs had to
introduce only the census figures to establish a constitutional violation.
What is the reason for this difference? Is the Court shifting the burden
of proof so as to encourage the desired result, 2 or is there a more
orthodox explanation?
Ostensibly, the reason is that Whitcomb did not involve a dilution
of the plaintiffs' right to vote. Reynolds protected a citizen against the
dilution of that right, but the plaintiffs in Whitcomb were claiming
denial of their right to representation. Therefore, they had to produce
evidence on the nature and quality of their representation, rather than
merely setting forth the census figures.
This explanation is partially correct, but not entirely. To understand its weakness, one must consider why the Court rejected Banzhaf's
first argument. If the right protected by Reynolds is the right of each
individual to cast his own vote without dilution-in other words, the
right to have equal voting power-then Banzhaf's first theory is the
logical result. Certainly, as Banzhaf points out, the measure of an individual's voting power is his chance of casting a tie-breaking vote; a voter
obviously exerts no power if he merely adds one more vote to a 100,000vote majority. And it is mathematically provable that a voter in a singlemember district has a smaller chance of casting a tie-breaking vote than
does a voter in a multi-member district.21 Because voters in a singlemember district have less voting power, it would seem inevitable that
they are denied a constitutional right.
However, the Supreme Court rejected Banzhaf's theory-and
rightly so, because the theory leads to absurd results. Imagine County
X, with 300,000 population, electing two senators. County Y, popula21Some commentators have suggested that the Court is doing this or even urged that it do so.
Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives:What is Fair Representation?.51 A.B.A.J. 319, 322 (1965);
Velvel, Suggested Approaches to ConstitutionalAdjudication and Apportionment, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1381, 1405 (1965); Note, The Apportionment Cases: An Expanded Concept of Equal
Protection, 1965 Vis. L. REv. 606, 643-44.
"See Banzhaf, supra note 6.
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tion 100,000, elects one. It is mathematically provable that a voter in
County X has a greater chance to cast a tie-breaking vote than a voter
in County Y. Does this mean that County Y is discriminated against?
23
Surely not. Yet that is the conclusion required by Banzhaf's reasoning.
If a theory leads logically to an absurd result, it must rest on a
mistaken assumption. Banzhaf's theory is no exception. He mistakenly
assumes that Reynolds assures each voter an equal chance to cast a tiebreaking vote. It does not. In reality the right guaranteed by Reynolds
is simply the right to population-based apportionment. The Court's
rejection of Banzhaf's theory proves that it was this, and not merely the
individual's right to cast his own ballot without dilution, that Reynolds
protected.2Y
The plaintiffs in Reynolds did not, of course, seek this right of
population-based apportionment for its own sake. They sought it as a
method of ensuring that they would have sufficient representatives in the
legislature to speak for their views. This points out the fundamental
distinction between Reynolds and Whitcomb: In the former, the plaintiffs sought to have the legislature apportioned by population as a means
of obtaining sufficient representation for their viewpoints. In the latter,
the plaintiffs wanted the courts to step in and directly assure them
representation. The difference between Reynolds and Whitcomb is the
difference between a procedural right and a substantive right.
With this distinction in mind, the position of the Court on the
burden of proof in Reynolds and Whitcomb can be more accurately
explained. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court established a constitutional
right to population-based apportionment. If census figures showing
population inequality among districts are produced, violation of this
right is demonstrated. But the Court has not held that any group has
a constitutional right to have its interests actually represented in the
legislature. Even if this right exists, its denial is not proved merely by
22See Banzhaf, supra note 6.
"Again, imagine Counties A, B. and C, each having 100,000 population, each electing one

senator. It is proposed to merge them into District Z which will elect two senators. Few if any
residents of these counties would agree to this change. Yet it is mathematically demonstrable that

the creation of District Z would increase the "voting power" of each voter in the district.
See 403 U.S. at 169 (Justice Harlan's refutation of Banzhaf's first theory).
wrhis does not mean that this right is not, as the Reynolds Court stated, an "individual and
personal" one. 377 U.S. at 561. Each citizen has an individual right to population-based legislative
apportionment. If this right is denied, it can be enforced in a suit by an individual citizen.
E.g.,'Reynolds v. Sims.

1971]

MINORITY REPRESENTATION

showing that multi-member districts are used or that members of the
particular group are rarely elected as legislators. A legislator does not
have to belong to a group to represent its interests adequately. In other
words, the Whitcomb plaintiffs not only failed to convince the Court
that it should recognize a constitutional right to representation, but also
failed to demonstrate that they were denied this right if it does exist. To
prove that multi-member districting denies a group its right of representation, it is not sufficient to show merely that multi-member districts are
used; it is also necessary to prove that the legislature has made decisions
which are harmful to the group and that these decisions would not have
been made but for the existence of the multi-member system. In establishing this requirement, the Court is not shifting the burden of proof at
all. It is only following the traditional rule that a plaintiff must show
that he has been harmed before the courts will give him relief.
The plaintiffs similarly failed to prove their case with respect to the
second of the two arguments advanced by Professor Banzhaf. Even~if
small-district voters have a right to be represented as effectively as multimember district voters, the denial of this right is not proved by the mere
fact that large-district legislators can vote en bloc. As the Court indicated, there would be nothing to prevent the Marion County legislators
from voting en bloc even if single-member districts were used.s Thus the
plaintiffs again failed to show that multi-member districting had actually denied them any right to representation.
The distinction between the right to population-based apportionment and the substantive right to representation may be important not
only for the allocation of the burden of proof but also for the ultimate
decision as to the constitutionality of multi-member districts. Possibly
the Supreme Court will not recognize the substantive right to representa2For that matter, even now there is nothing to prevent rural legislators from forming blocks

of their own. In any case, the increase in power resulting from bloc voting is fairly slight in a body
as large as a legislature. See Banzhaf, supra note 7, at 335-38. In all probability it is outweighed
by other, intangible factors, such as the possibly greater competence of small-district legislators,

the distrust of rural lawmakers for those from the cities, and the fact that the presence of a largecounty bloc may encourage other legislators to cooperate more closely among themselves. Certainly

in North Carolina the large Mecklenburg County delegation derives no great strength from its
numbers. See Walls, The 'Stateof Mecklenburg' Does Poorly In Legislature, The Charlotte Obse-

rver, May 23, 1971, § B, at 3, col. 4. Banzhaf himself pointed out that his "analysis does not
pretend to be a complete picture of the representative system and the conclusions do not necessarily
reflect all political realities" and intangible factors. Banzhaf, supra note 6, at 1311.
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tion as a constitutional right at all. Certainly it did not do so in
Whitcomb, and there are indications in Justice White's majority opinion
2
that it will not recognize such a right in future cases. 1
Several considerations would justify the Court in upholding multimember districts and refusing to create a constitutional right of minority
representation. One of these is the fact that should the courts guarantee
representation for one minority group, many other groups would also
seek it.27 Losing political parties,2 Indians,2' 9 Catholics, farmers, the
poor, and a host of other minorities would claim the right to representation in proportion to their members. Providing representation for all
these interests would be virtually impossible because of the overlap
among them." Even the proportional-representation system, as used in
Europe without encouraging results,3' 1 only assures representation to all
political parties 32
nSee notes 27, 33, 36 & 38 infra.

2Ihis problem was discussed in part V of the majority opinion, 403 U.S. at 156-60.
2It seems unlikely, however, that the Court would look with favor upon a defeated party's
claim that it had been denied its right to representation. In Whitcomb it rejected the plaintiffs'
suggestion that multi-member districting discriminated against losing political parties because the
winning party ordinarily took all the district's seats in each election. 403 U.S. at 160.
If the Court took any step towards requiring the percentage distribution of seats in the legislature to approximate the percentage distribution of votes for each party, it would be superimposing
an element of proportional representation on the system of election by districts.
2'See Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 119 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
"See Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Vahle,
1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 46; Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in
Retrospect, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 729,748-52 (1969).
31
Proportional representation was used in Fourth Republic France and is now used in Italy
and various small European nations. There is no evidence that it has made these governments
unusually good or unusually responsive to the people's will. There is substantial evidence that it
has encouraged the development of a multi-party system. M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 24555 (2d Eng. ed. rev. 1959); S. LiPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION 293-306 (1963). There is also reason
to believe that multi-party systems are on the whole less beneficial than two-party systems, except
in nations which are sharply divided into hostile economic, social, or religious groups. Id. at 30712. Surely the Fourth Republic, which in 1958 collapsed because of its instability, and Italy, which
lurches from one crisis to another, are not proper models for American government.
2Justice Douglas' dissent offered an interesting response to this objection. He argued that the
fifteenth amendment's ban on racial discrimination in elections could be used to limit the guarantee
of minority representation to racial groups. 403 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting and concurring). Such a proposal might well have appealed strongly to the Court, because it combined two
themes that have appeared and reappeared in Supreme Court decisions of the last twenty years:
the drive for voting equality, and the struggle for racial equality, which has produced Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and other historic constitutional decisions. Yet
the Court rejected this approach, because it simply does not solve the problem. There are almost
as many overlapping interest groups among particular races as among the population as a whole.
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Another reason for not establishing a substantive right to representation is the fact that the system of democratic election by districts is
inconsistent with the notion that any minority group or interest group
should be guaranteed representation.3 Under the district election system, each campaign is a struggle among interest groups to secure representation. Ordinarily the winning candidate represents not just one, but
many of these groups .34 On the other hand, those interests which support
the losing candidate are left without representation. The winning candidate is the one who can obtain the support of the broadest coalition of
various interest groups (and also of other voters who do not vote according to their self-interest). If the Court decides not to assure any interest
group of representation, it would avoid disrupting this system of electoral struggle. It would be choosing to play the role of a referee who lines
the racers up even at the start of the race, rather than that of a puppeteer
who lines them up even at the finish.
A third difficulty that would arise if the Court were to create a right
to minority representation would be the problem of fashioning a remedy.
The Whitcomb plaintiffs wanted to form ghetto districts with Negro
majorities. Other Negroes, however, might object to this plan, preferring
instead a system which would spread the black vote out among more
districts in order to influence more legislators. For instance, in Wright
v. Rockefeller 35 a Negro sued to break up a ghetto district, contending
that the all-Negro district constituted segregation. The Supreme Court
held that she had failed to sustain her burden of proving that the district
was in fact a racial gerrymander, but it did not suggest that her contentions were without merit. 3 How can a court maximize minority representation, as sought in Whitcomb, without minimizing minority influence and thus raising the issue of Wright? Should it seek a happy me37
dium? Is a court the proper agency to seek such a medium?
3This reason is reflected in the majority opinion, 403 U.S. at 149-55. See Auerbach, supra

note 30, at 37-38, who reaches the same conclusion in a different manner.
uId. at 5 1-52; Irwin, supra note 30, at 735; see S. LiPsEr, supra note 31, at 287. Concerning
the role of political parties in this electoral struggle of interest groups, see L. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL
PARTIES IN WESTERN DENIOCRACIES

73, 275-81 (1967).

-376 U.S. 52 (1964).
"Cf. 403 U.S. at 156 n.34. A similar case is Honeywood v. Rockefeller, 214 F. Supp. 897
(1963), affd inem., 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
""Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found . . . the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial

discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (Justice Brennan's third criterion for a
political question).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

On a more practical level, the Court may have been influenced by
the fact that while Reynolds' impact has been both substantial and
beneficial, it has not produced the radical changes predicted by some
commentators. If the benefits of the first stage were less than anticipated 3 perhaps the Court felt that it should turn to other areas rather
than incur the burden of carrying reapportionment into a new and complicated second stage. Influenced by considerations such as these, the

Court in Whitcomb declined to recognize a right to minority representation.39 In the future it may explicitly reject this right-or so it seems until
one reads Connorv. Johnson.40

Connorcontrasts so sharply with Whitcomb that it raises the possibility of a "double standard" under which multi-member districts will
be upheld or overturned depending on their location in the nation. In
Connor, decided four days before Whitcomb, the Supreme Court re-

quired the establishment of single-member districts in Hinds County,
Mississippi.
Connor began as a typical reapportionment case. The plaintiffs
33See, e.g., R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 574-78 (1968); T. DYE, POLITICS, EcoNOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC 270-81 (1966); Elliott, Prometheus. Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes
Unbound: The PoliticalConsequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 474 (1970); Irwin,
supra note 30, at 753; Dolbeare, Book Review, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 616, 618-19; 403 U.S. at 148
n.27, 154 n.33.
31Despite these objections, the Court might have felt compelled to rule for plaintiffs if it had
felt that racial and political gerrymandering were thwarting the people's will today to the same
extent that malapportionment thwarted it before 1964. Fortunately, this is not the case. Reynolds
and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), have taken the strongest weapon away from those
who seek excessive power by gerrymandering.
Reynolds made racial gerrymandering especially risky. Imagine State S with 77,000 population--63,000 white, 14,000 black-divided into seven legislative districts. To keep Negroes out of
the legislature, the districts are arranged so that each contains 9,000 whites and 2,000 Negroes. No
Negroes will be elected; nevertheless, the next legislature may be quite sympathetic to Negroes and
their problems, for the blacks have been able to cast 2,000 votes in each district for the candidate
most favorable to them. Likewise, if all the legislators are elected from one seven-member district,
the Negroes can influence each seat. Now, suppose the courts order reapportionment to insure
minority representation. They create one ghetto district with 11,000 Negroes and six other districts
of 500 Negroes and 10,500 whites. A Negro will now sit in the legislature, but he may be a lonely
figure among the conservatives elected from the other six districts, each almost lily-white. See
PoliticalTragedy, Atlanta Constitution, June 7, 1971, § A, at 4, col. I (editorial). Political gerrymanders involve similar risk after Reynolds.
No one could sensibly contend that Reynolds eliminated all the dangers of gerrymandering.
What can be argued, however, is that Reynolds reduced the evil to such a point that further
constitutional protection is not required.
"Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971) (per curiam).
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argued successfully that the deviations in Mississippi's apportionment
scheme were excessive, and the three-judge court announced that it
would adopt its own reapportionment plan." Three days later the plaintiffs submitted four suggested plans which utilized only single-member
districts. The three judges rejected these plans, however, and adopted a
plan making Hinds County a multi-member district. They agreed that
"single-member districting would be 'ideal' for Hinds County"4 2 but felt
that there was too little time to subdivide the county before the legislative
filing deadline seventeen days later.
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, instructed the lower
court to adopt a single-member plan, "absent insurmountable difficulties, '4 3 and to postpone the filing deadline as long as necessary to effect
this purpose.4 4 The majority stated that the three judges had had sufficient time to subdivide Hinds County, pointing out that plaintiffs had
produced four plans in three days. The Court held that "when district
courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter. '45 Thus, the Court has endorsed multi-member districts in Indiana
and banned them in Mississippi. The cases were widely interpreted in the
press as meaning that multi-member districts would henceforth be per6
mitted everywhere except in the South. 4
It would be unfortunate if the Supreme Court were to adopt such
a rule, for the double standard is quite devoid of any constitutional basis.
If the Court found the Hinds County multi-member district unconstitutional without similarly invalidating the Marion County district in
Whitcomb, it must have assumed that the Mississippi district, unlike the
"Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
4402 U.S. at 692.
"mId.
"Id. at 692-93. Justice Black, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Harlan, dissented. The

dissenting opinion dealt almost entirely with the confusion that this last-minute decision would
create in the Hinds County electoral process. Id. at 693-95.

On remand, the lower court found that "insurmountable difficulties" were present because
there were no accurate population figures for each precinct of Hinds County. The 1970 census did

not determine the population of each precinct but instead subdivided the county into "enumerator

districts" with boundaries that did not correspond with precinct boundaries. Thus multi-member
districting remains in effect in Hinds County. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Miss.
1971).

"402 U.S. at 692.
"E.g., Greensboro Daily News, June 8, 1971, § A, at 1,col. 6, quoting Professor Robert R.

Dixon.

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 50

one in Indiana, was an intentional racial gerrymander banned by
Gomillion v. Lightfoot." But this assumption seems unwarranted, for
there was no showing that the Hinds County district was racially inspired, much less that all Southern multi-member districts (and none in
the North) are so motivated. Multi-member districts ordinarily are
based on the desire to preserve county lines, not the desire to preserve

white supremacy.48 They were common in the South earlier in the century when Negroes were effectively disfranchised and racial gerryman-

ders were unnecessary.49 Since the recent rise of Negro voting, their use

has actually declined. 0 In view of these considerations, the assumption
of a racial motivation for all Southern multi-member districts seems
51
arbitrary.
Since the geographical double standard is not based on valid reasoning, it would be wrong to assume that the Supreme Court has
adopted it unless Connor and Whitcomb can be reconciled in no other
47364 U.S. 339 (1960). Decisions enforcing this ban include Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901
(M.D. Ala. 1966), modified andaffd, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp.
96 (M.D. Ala. 1965). Determining the legislature's intent is not an easy or an infallible process,
however. See Sims v. Baggett, supra at 107 n.17. Compare Sims (use of numbered-seat system as
evidence showing intent to create racial gerrymander) with Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492
(S.D. Miss.), af'd mem., 386 U.S. 483 (1967) (numbered seats used in court-drawn plan).
"See Courtsand counties, Greensboro Daily News, June 9, 1971, § A, at 6, col. I (editorial).
"In 1956, Holmes, Washington, Monroe, Noxubee, Copiah, Panola, Yazoo, and Marshall
Counties of Mississippi constituted three-member districts in the state House of Representatives,
without any subdistricting. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3376 (1956). Essentially the same apportionment
system was in effect in 1942, when the "white primary" system was still in effect. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 3326 (1942). In 1927, all the above counties, plus Hinds County, elected three representatives
without subdistricting. ANNOTATED MIss. CODE §§ 6177, 6186 (Hemingway 1927).
"Multi-member districts have been abolished in Oklahoma and greatly reduced in Tennessee
during the past decade. Compare tit. 14, ch. 3, §§ 1-3, [1961] Okla. Sess. L. 182 (repealed 1963)
with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 112 (Supp. 1971); ch. 1, [1962] Public Acts-Tenn. Extraordinary Sess. 7 (repealed 1963) with TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to -110 (1971).
"Professor Dixon suggested that there is a presumption of intentional racial gerrymandering
in the states and counties subject to the Voting Rights Act. Greensboro Daily News, supra note
46. This presumption, however, is no more defensible than any other form of the double standard.
A number of provisions of the Voting Rights Act apply only to areas where less than fifty per cent
of the voting-age population voted in 1964 or in 1968.42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970). This criterion
has a logical, natural relationship to the question of whether Negroes were being denied their right
to vote; obviously, if a large group is denied the franchise, voting turnout will be lower. It has no
such relationship to the question of intentional racial gerrymandering. Gerrymandering does not
involve a denial of the right to cast one's ballot. It is perfectly possible to have gerrymandering
and high voting turnout or to have low turnout and no gerrymandering. To assume that the
legislature intended to create a racial gerrymander in 1971, because voting turnout was low in 1964
or 1968, is no more justified than to assume a racial gerrymander because a place is south of.a
certairn parallel of latitude.

1971]

MINORITY REPRESENTATION

way. At first glance, it would seem quite possible to reconcile the two
cases without using a double standard. In Whitcomb the Court dealt
with a minimum constitutional requirement; it held that the Indiana
multi-member districting plan met this minimum. Connor, on the other
hand, dealt not with what is permissible but rather with what is best.
The Supreme Court has a supervisory power which enables it to impose
rules on the lower federal courts without making them constitutional
requirements.5 2 Exercising this supervisory power, the Court determined
that single-member districts were desirable for policy reasons, and so it
required the district court to use them in framing its own plan. But
single-member districts are not constitutionally required; legislatures
may still create multi-member districts.
Unfortunately, this reconciliation has a hole in it. In Whitcomb,
also, the lower court adopted its own reapportionment plan. 53 This was
necessary, since the Indiana legislature did not meet the Swann-Kilgarlin
equal-population standard. If Connor means that single-member districts are required in court-drawn plans, the Whitcomb lower court
obeyed this rule, and the Supreme Court should have affirmed. But
instead it reversed. Apparently the "rule of Connor v. Johnson" is not
a uniform rule after all.
It might appear, then, that the contrasting results of these two cases
cannot be explained except by the double standard. But before accepting
this conclusion, one should examine more closely the exact words used
in Connor: "[S]ingle-member districts are preferable to large multimember districts as a general matter.' ' s4 In other words, exceptions can
be made to the Connor rule. And if any exceptions are to be made, then
for several reasons Whitcomb was a proper case in which to do so.
First, the plaintiffs in Whitcomb offered no ground on which the
Court was prepared to grant them single-member districts. Their constitutional arguments were rejected. The only reason why the lower court
acted properly in adopting a reapportionment plan was that it found that
Indiana's legislature violated the equal-population requirement. It made
this finding entirely on its own; there was no such allegation in the
52
This power has often been exercised in criminal procedure cases. See, e.g., Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J.

319, 327-37.
"Chavis v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
'4402 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs' complaint.15 So if the Whitcomb plaintiffs had obtained single-member districts, they would have done so only through luck. Second, if the Indiana legislature had reapportioned during the time period
allotted and had sufficiently reduced the population inequalities without
abolishing multi-member districts, the Supreme Court would have had
to accept the reapportionment as constitutional. However, the lower
court expressly instructed the legislature not to follow this course. 5
Therefore, for all practical purposes, if the legislature wanted to preserve
multi-member districts, there was nothing it could do but let the lower
court impose a reapportionment plan and appeal from that decision. For
the Supreme Court to hold that this road, too, was blocked-thus penalizing the legislature just because the lower court had made an erroneous
decision-would have been very harsh. Third, the practical significance
of the whole question was reduced since Indiana had already reapportioned according to the 1970 census, using single-member districts only.
In Connor, on the other hand, these three factors were not present.
Moreover, the Supreme Court may well have been particularly displeased and provoked with the lower court ruling in the Connor case,
because the district court had swept aside the plaintiffs' four suggested
single-member plans without making any attempt to explain in full its
reasons for adopting instead a multi-member plan. 7 The lower court's
brush-off of the plaintiffs' suggested plans may have caused the Court
to look at the Connorcase with a particularly critical eye.
Connor v. Johnson and Whitcomb v. Chavis clearly do not constitute a precise and unmistakable ruling on the issues of multi-member
districting and minority representation." However, they at least open the
door for a just solution to the reapportionment question. By distinguishing between the right to population-based apportionment and the sub15403 U.S. at 131.

5Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1392 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
57Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D. Miss. 1971). On remand the district court
explained more fully the inadequacies of the plaintiffs' suggested plans. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F.
Supp. 521, 525-26 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
rhis is demonstrated by the fact that the two district courts which have considered the

question since Whitcomb and Connor have reached three different conclusions. In Wold v. Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (D. Mont. 1971) (per curiam), the court followed Whitcomb and
simply ignored Connor. In Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (E.D Va. 1971), the majority

in a two-to-one decision viewed Connor as forbidding large multi-member districts and Whitcomb
as upholding small ones. This argument was easily refuted by Lewis, J.,dissenting, who pointed

out that Whitcomb involved a fifteen-member district and Connoronly a twelve-member district.
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stantive right to representation, the Court will be able to avoid the maze
of enforcement difficulties foreseen in Baker v. Carr by Justices Frankfurter59 and Harlan6" without denying relief to the victims of malapportionment. Such a result would disprove the contentions of judicial conservatives who argue that courts should not attempt to rectify social or
political evils, for it will show that the judiciary can keep a sweeping,
forward-looking decision such as Reynolds firmly under control and
limit its scope at the point at which further broadening would cease to
be beneficial. It would show that there is a third alternative between
judicial chaos and judicial immobility.
ROBERT STARR GILLAM

Judge Lewis suggested, instead, id. at 1148, that Whitcomb was the controlling case and that
Connor was decided solely on the basis of the lower court's belief that "single-member districting
would be 'ideal' for Hinds County." 402 U.S. at 692.
Judge Lewis's argument is plausible, but two objections can be raised. First, the Supreme
Court's language in Connor was general and indicated no limitation to a particular fact situation:
"IS]ingle-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter." Id.
Second, the Connordistrict court did not determine that Hinds County was unusually well adapted
to single-member districting; it only suggested that ideally all districts electing four or more legislators should be broken down into single-member districts. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506,
519 (S.D. Miss. 1971). Connor cannot be distinguished on the basis of its peculiar fact situation
when in fact there was no peculiar fact situation.
"'369 U.S. 186, 266-70, 323-30 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
GoId. at 339 (dissenting opinion).

